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Notes
A Comparative Analysis of
Procedural Third-Party Practice
This Note compares the three basic types of third-party prac-
tice found in American jurisdictions-first, the system requir-
ing court permission before a third party can be impleaded;
second, the system permitting impleader as a matter of right;
and third, the hybrid system permitting impleader as of right
before a set time, but requiring court permission in order to
implead a third party after that time. The author concludes
that the hybrid system best satisfies the standards of pro-
cedural efficiency and fairness to all parties.
TIRD-party practice, commonly referred to as "implead-
er," is a procedural device by which the defendant in a lawsuit may
assert a claim against a third person who is or may be liable to him
for all or part of the claim asserted against him by the plaintiff.
Thus, where A sues B, B may implead C on the theory that C will
be liable to B if B is found liable to A' Unnecessary duplication of
trials is avoided when the defendant's third-party claim and the
plaintiff's claim are settled in the same lawsuit.*-' Perhaps the best
known example of third-party practice is Rule 14(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in part:
Before the service of his answer a defendant may move ex parte or, after
the service of his answer, on notice to the plaintiff, for leave as a third-
party plaintiff to serve a summons and complaint upon a person not a
party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the
plaintiff's claim against him.
Procedural rules governing third-party practice in American juris-
dictions fall into three classes-those requiring the permission of the
court before a third party may be impleaded; those alloving im-
pleader as a matter of right; and those allowing unrestricted im-
1. Under Texas and Missouri procedures, a defendant may also implead a third party
on the ground that he may be directly liable to the plaintiff. See Tmz. I. Crv. P. 38 (a);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 507.080(1) (Vernon's 1949).
2. See Lee's Inc. v. Transcontinental Underwriters, 9 F.R.D. 470, 472 (D. Md. 1949).
The purpose of third-party practice has been summarized as follows: "The dominant
object of this Rule is 'procedural economy.' It seeks to prevent the court from having to
coasider the same evidence at two hearings, and thus to save the time and cost of dupli-
cating the evidence. It guarantees consistent results from the same or similar evidence,
since any judgment recovered by the plaintiff against the original defendant binds the
third-party defendant with respect to the disposition of any firther claim between the
latter parties. It also bridges the gap which would otherise elapse between the entry
of judgment against the defendant, and the defendant's obtaining a later judgment
against the third-party defendant by independent action." 2 ScHN'rzun & Wmu-sm,
NEW JERsEy Ruis SEnvicE A IV-346-47 (1954).
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pleader at any time before a set time, but requiring permission of
the court for impleader after that time. The purpose of this Note
is to examine these three types of impleader in an attempt to de-
termine which one best satisfies the standards of procedural effi-
ciency and fairness to the parties involved in the action.
PERMISSIVE IMPLEADER
Federal Rule 14(a) is an example of what may be termed per-
missive impleader: the defendant can implead a third party only
after obtaining permission of the court to do so.3 Since this require-
ment represents an obvious procedural inconvenience to both the
defendant and the court without affording them any compensating
advantage, it must be designed to protect the interests of either
the third party or the plaintiff.
Whenever the court denies a defendant's motion for implcader,
the third party is saved the time and expense of hiring an attorney
to defend him. This protection might arguably justify the court-
permission requirement. Although the third party has no greater
qualitative interest in not being impleaded than does any person
in not being sued, there is a greater likelihood that a defendant will
seek to implead a third party on the basis of a doubtful or unwar-
ranted claim than that a plaintiff will bring an original action based
on such a claim. To the defendant already enga e in a lawsuit, the
additional expense of impleading a third party is quite small when
compared with the expense a plaintiff must incur in bringing an
original action.
On closer analysis, however, this argument becomes less persu-
asive. So long as the defendant's claim has some legal merit-even
though it may be of doubtful validity-the defendant should be
entitled to assert that claim. Since courts generally do grant im-
S. The following states have adopted the same or substantially similar procedures:
Arizona: Aiuz. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
Colorado: COLO. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
Delaware: DEL. SuPER. CT. (Civ.) R. 14(a).
Iowa: IowA R. Crv. P. 33(b).
Kentucky: Ky. R. Crv. P. 14.01.
Minnesota: MiNN. R. Civ. P. 14.01.
Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 507.080 (Vernon's 1952).
Nevada: NEv. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
New Jersey: N.J. RuL~s 4:14-1 (a).
Texas: TEx. R. Civ. P. 38(a).
Utah: UTAH R. Crv. P. 14(a).
Wisconsin: iVs. STAT. ANNOTATiONS § 260.19(3) (1957).
Virginia has expressly abolished third-party practice: see VA. R. Civ. P. 8:9.1.
4. The defendant is required to 1) prepare his motion and formulate supporting
arguments; 2) give notice of his motion to the plaintiff when seeking the court's per-
mission after the service of his answer; and 3) appear at the hearing on the motion to
present his arguments. The court is required to conduct a hearing on defendant's motion
in order to determine whether to grant defendant's request.
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pleader in such a case,5 the third party gains nothing. Only in those
few cases where the third-party claim is clearly unmeritorious is the
court likely to deny the defendant's motion. " Therefore, the per-
missive requirement affords potential third-party defendants very
little protection. Furthermore, in actual practice, less than full pro-
tection is afforded third parties for courts occasionally do permit im-
pleader even on the basis of unwarranted third-party claims."
Consequently, the requirement must be primarily intended to
protect the interests of the original plaintiff in the lawsuit. The
plaintiff is primarily interested in successfully prosecuting his cause
of action as rapidly as possible. Since the entrance of a third party
into the lawsuit can seriously delay the original action,8 the plaintiff
has a legitimate objection to an unwarranted impleader.9
When the defendant requests permission to implead a third party
before the service of his answer, Federal Rule 14(a) does not re-
quire notice to the plaintiff of the motion.10 Thus, when the defend-
dant acts promptly, the plaintiff has no opportunity to object to
impleader until after the third party has already been impleaded.
However, it is doubtful that impleader at such an early stage in the
5. See, e.g., Young v. Atlantic Refining Co., 9 F.R.D. 491, 492 (N.D. Ohio 1949), in
which the court refused to sustain plaintiff's objections to granting defendant permission
to implead a third party on an alleged indemnity agreement because "the pleadings and
the agreement do not show on their face that the agreement was clearly inapplicable
.. ,(Emphasis added.)
6. See, e.g., Barnard-Curtiss Co. v. Maehl, 117 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1941); Murtagh v.
Phillips Waste Oil Pick-Up & Road Oil Serv., 17 F.RtD. 495 (E.D. Mich. 1955).
7. In the following cases, although the defendant was granted permission to implead
a third party, his third-party complaint was subsequently dismissed; in each case the
court said, in effect, that the defendant completely failed in his attempt to state a claim
upon which the third party might be liable to the defendant: Heitman v. Davis, 119
F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1941); Fowler Industrial Service, Inc. v. John Mohr & Sons Co.,
10 F.R.D. 271 (N.D. Ohio 1950); North Dakota ex. rel. Workmen's Compensation
Bureau v. Przyby]ski, 98 F. Supp. 21 (D. Mim. 1951); Birdsong v. General Motors
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
8. In Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsch-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatsehappij, 6
F.R.D. 297, 301-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), the court summarized the conflicting considera-
tions as follows: "The trial of defendant's claim together with plaintiff's claim will, of
course, delay and prolong somewhat the trial of plaintiff's Claim. But as against that
result there must be weighed the saving in time of the court in trying one case instead
of two, thus avoiding both circuity of action and a duplication of work."
9. When the defendant requests permission to implead a third party shortly before
trial, the court will normally deny his request if impleader would require delaying trial
of plaintiff's action. See, e.g., Spaulding v. Parry Navigation Co., 10 F.R.D. 290
(S.D.N.Y. 1950) (request made when plaintiff's action was the third case on the cal-
endar); Holstlaw v. Southern Ry., 9 F.R.D. 276 (E.D. Mo. 1949) (request made ap-
proximately thirty days before date set for trial); United States v. Shuman, 1 F.R.D.
251 (N.D.W. Va. 1940) (request made within a week of the date of the trial). See
also, McPherrin v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 1 F.R.D. 88, 90 (D.C. Neb. 1940).
10. In the following states the defendent must notify the plaintiff of his motion for
impleader in all cases:
Kentucky: Ky. R. Civ. P. 14.01.
New Jersey: N.J. Rux.zs 4:14-1 (a).
Texas: TEx R. Crv. P. 38(a).
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lawsuit could seriously delay the trial of the plaintiff's action. Any
time after the third party has been impleaded, the plaintiff can
raise his objections " to joining the third-party action with his own
action against the defendant. If the third-party action is likely to
delay final determination of the lawsuit, the plaintiff has ample time
to move either for a severance or a dismissal. Therefore, the plain-
tiff gains little if any protection from the requirement that the
defendant who seeks impleader before answering the plaintiff's
complaint must first obtain the permission of the court. Furthermore
since there are no objecting parties to an ex garte motion, the like-
lihood that the court will grant the defendant's request is extremely
great, and consequently the court-permission requirement is little
more than a procedural inconvenience to the defendant and the
court.
When the defendant moves to implead a third party after the
service of his answer, Federal Rule 14(a) provides that he must
notify the plaintiff of his motion. The plaintiff is thereby afforded
an opportunity to raise his objections before the third party is im-
pleaded. Being able to oppose the defendant's motion at this time
on grounds other than potential delay of the trial is of no special
advantage to the plaintiff, however, for other objections could be
raised without any prejudice to him after the third party has been
impleaded. If the defendant's motion is timely there will always be
sufficient time remaining before the trial for the plaintiff to raise his
objections on a motion to sever or dismiss. Thus, the primary reason
for affording the plaintiff an opportunity to object before the third
party is impleaded must be to protect the plaintiff's interest in pre-
venting delay of his trial.
Courts have consistently held that the defendant's motion should
be denied when made shortly before the trial if granting the mo-
tion at that time would result in delaying the plaintiff's action.' 2
Since the plaintiff may object to impleader on grounds of delay after
the third party has been impleaded, it is of no special benefit to the
plaintiff to be able to raise this objection before that time except in
cases when the defendant requests permission very shortly before
the trial. Only in those cases could the hearing on the defendant's
motion take time which would otherwise be used for trial on the
merits of the plaintiff's claim.
Permissive impleader under Federal Rule 14(a) is subject to one
basic criticism. The court is often called upon twice to determine
the propriety of impleader; once when the defendant moves for
11. 1 BARRoN & HoLrzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 427 at 868 (Rules
ed. 1950), states: "The proper method to test the propriety of an order granting
leave to file a third party complaint is to move to vacate the order and strike the com-
plaint but a motion to dismiss has been treated as a motion to vacate."
12. See cases cited note 9 supra.
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permission and again, after the third party has been impleaded,
when either the plaintiff or the third party moves for a severance
or dismissal of the third party action. Since the third party will not
have notice of the defendant's motion, and therefore will have no
opportunity to raise his objections to being impleaded at that time,
the court's rulings in the first hearing cannot bind him. Once the
third party has been impleaded he can demand a reconsideration
of the objections which were previously raised by the plaintiff and
dismissed.13 The judge will not be in a good position to disregard
these objections, for the third party may have new evidence which
would influence the judge to change his ruling. Although there is
nothing inherently wrong with holding two hearings on the pro-
priety of impleader, very little is gained if the second hearing in-
volves merely a reconsideration of the issues raised at the first one.
Before a defendant may implead a third party, "some substan-
tive basis" for his claim must be "found to exist."' 4 When the de-
fendant moves to implead a third party the court has an opportunity
to examine the sufficiency of the third-party claim, because the de-
fendant is required to include with his motion a copy of the third-
party summons and complaint.15 The defendant's complaint must
meet the test of "whether there is disclosed in the record . . . rea-
sonable cause to believe that the defendant may be able to estab-
lish on the part of the proposed third party defendant, such liability
as the Rule contemplates." 10 In a number of cases, however, courts
have permitted a defendant to implead a third party and then have
subsequently dismissed the action on the ground that the defendant
completely failed to state a valid claim against the third partj. One
court, granting the third party's motion to dismiss, stated:
It seems obvious that the third-party complaint .. . must be dismissed
because (1) it fails to allege any grounds upon which the defendants
. . . would be entitled to any relief as against this third-party defendant,
and (2) the third-party complaint fails to come within the purview and
scope of Rule 14(a) .... Is
Presumably these courts determined the sufficiency of the third-
party claim before granting the defendant's motion."9 In these cases
13. See Scmrrzm & W mnTE-N, 2 NEw JERsEY RUt.xs Smnvmv A IV-457 (1954).
14. Koenigs v. Travis, 246 Minn. 466, 469, 75 N.V.2d 478, 481 (1956).
15. See Form 22 of the Fsn. F. Civ. P. See also, Ivey v. Daus, 17 F.R.D. 319
(S.D.N.Y. 1955), where the court denied defendant's request for permission because
he failed to include a copy of the third-party summons and complaint in his motion.
16. A B & C Motor Transp. Co. v. Moger, 10 F.R.D. 613, 615 (E.D.N.Y. 1950).
17. See cases cited notes 6 and 7 supra.
18. North Dakota ex reL Workmen's Compensation Bureau v. Przybylski, 98 F. Supp.
21,22 (D. Minn. 1951).
19. For examples of cases where the defendant's motion was denied because of the
insufficiency of the third-party claim, see cases cited in note 6 supra.
1958]
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both the court and the parties bore the inconvenience of two hear-
ings on the identical issue.
Manley v. Standard Oil Co. of Texas2° is further evidence that
permissive impleader often results in a duplication of hearings on
the same issue. In Manley, the plaintiff sued the defendant to gain
a clear title to a tract of land. The defendant, claiming $600,000 in
damages, obtained permission to implead an unincorporated asso-
ciation and an individual as third-party defendants. The third par-
ties' motion to dismiss the defendant's complaint was sustained,
principally because the trial of the third-party action together with
the original action would have been highly prejudicial to the plain-
tiff.2 In granting the motion, the Chief Judge stated:
This Motion to Dismiss by the third party defendants leads me to doubt
the wisdom of my original order....
The recovery sought against the third party by the defendant, is so out
of line with any recovery sought by the plaintiffs as to challenge the wis-
dom of the order permitting such making of parties.22
Apparently the judge granted the defendant permission to implead
the third parties and then subsequently changed his mind about the
propriety of impleader and dismissed the third-party action. Since
the judge had the third-party complaint (containing the $600,000
damage claim) before him when he granted the defendant's motion,
he could have determined at that time that the impleader would
be prejudicial to the plaintiff.
However, the objections raised on a motion to sever or dismiss
may be different from those considered by the court in the first hear-
ing. On the defendant's motion for impleader, the two primary con-
siderations are whether the defendant has stated a claim against the
third party which gives reasonable cause to believe that the third
party might be secondarily liable to him, and whether impleader
would prejudicially delay the trial of plaintiff's lawsuit. The second
hearing, on the other hand, often involves new objections to the
impleader raised by the third party. Nevertheless, little is gained
by resolving the objections to the same third-party action in sepa-
rate hearings.
The conclusion seems inescapable that whatever slight protection
is afforded the plaintiff by the court-permission requirement is out-
weighed by the procedural inconveniences caused by the require-
ment. One authority has concluded:
[I]t is silly for a judge to purport to exercise his discretion at the time of
defendant's motion; a much better procedure would be for him to allow
service of the third-party complaint, reserving a final decision on its pro-
20. 8 F.R.D. 354 (E.D. Tex. 1948).
21. See the discussion in court's opinion, id. at 356.
22. Id. at 355-56.
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priety until the third-party defendant has answered, or has raised his own
objections to being brought into the suit.m
If this suggestion were followed, the permission requirement would
be, for all practical purposes, a mere procedural technicality afford-
ing little, if any, protection to the parties.
IPLEADER As oF RIGHT
New York has attempted to avoid the shortcomings found in the
permissive system by adopting a procedure which permits the de-
fendant to implead a third party as a matter of right; he need not
obtain the court's permission before doing so.-4 Therefore, under
the New York system, a court is never called upon to rule on the
propriety of impleader until after the third party has been im-
pleaded, and consequently the possibility of two hearings on that
issue is eliminated. 5 Furthermore, the defendant and the court are
spared the inconveniences resulting from the court-permission re-
quirement.26
To protect the interests of the plaintiff and the third party, New
York expressly empowers a judge to make orders for the "preven-
tion of delay and injustice":
The court, in its discretion, may dismiss a third-party complaint without
prejudice to the bringing of another action, order a separate trial of the
third-party claim or of any separate issue thereof, or make such other
orders concerning the proceedings as may be necessary to further justice
or convenience. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether
the controversy between the third-party plaintiff and the third-party de-
fendant will unduly delay the determination of the main action or preju-
dice any party to the action .... 27
As already pointed out, the plaintiff and the third party actually
gain very little protection from the court-permission requirement,
and therefore the New York procedure for protecting their interests
will undoubtedly suffice in most cases. There are, however, at least
two instances in which the New York procedure fails to protect the
interests of the plaintiff or the third party as extensively as does the
permissive system. The New York statute further provides:
23. Wright, Joinder of Claims and Parties Under Modern Pleading Rules, 36 ML%-.%.
L. v. 580, 612 (1952).
24. See N.Y. Crv. PIAC. Acr. § 193-a (1). The defendant can avail himself of the
remedy under section 193-a only after interposing his answer. Booke v. Dime Say.
Bank, 204 Misc. 840, 127 N.Y.S.2d 59 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
25. North Dakota recently has adopted a similar procedure; see N.D.R. Cv. P.
14(a). A proposed amendment to the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure suggests that
a similar procedure be adopted. See, DnAFr oF Azmen.m sTo TEm Rurms or CrviiPOCEUE FOR TH Dxsnucr CouRs REcormNDm (1958) To THE [Mn-,,-xsorA]
SuPREmE CoURT BY rrs ADvisoRY Co.'\snT 2 (Comm. Print 1958).
26. See 12TH AN. REP. or = N.Y. JuD. CouNcu 199-202 (1946).
27. N.Y. Crv. Pxc. Aar § 193-a(4).
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* . . A motion to dismiss a third-party complaint pursuant to this sub-
division may be made after the third-party defendant has appeared in the
action by the plaintiff or the third-party defendant upon notice to all the
parties who have appeared.
28
Although the third party is permitted to move to dismiss the third-
party complaint before answering,29 the plaintiff must wait until
after the third party has "appeared" before making a similar mo-
tion.30 This requirement is designed to avoid any possibility of two
separate hearings on objections to the impleader; if the plaintiff
could move to dismiss before the third-party defendant appeared,
objections might be raised that would also properly be raised later
by the third party. As a result of this provision, however, the plain-
tiff may be unable to prevent some delay if the third party is im-
pleaded shortly before the trial is to commence because the third
party may not appear until after the trial has begun. In these cases
consideration of the merits of the plaintiff's claim would have to be
deferred until the judge determined the propriety of impleader.
Even though the judge normally could rule on the plaintiff's objec-
tions within a short time, the interruption probably will cause some
disruptive influence on the proceedings.
The second instance in which the New York procedure fails to
afford complete protection to the parties is where the defendant
impleads a third party on the basis of an unwarranted claim. Since
the court has no opportunity to rule on the invalidity of the defend-
ant's claim before the third party is impleaded, a defendant can
conceivably implead a third party upon any theory of liability how-
ever spurious. Not only is this objectionable to the third party, but
also to the plaintiff whose interests may be prejudiced if the de-
fendant uses his right to implead as a tool for harrassment.
A modification of the permissive system, providing that the de-
fendant must notify both the plaintiff and the third party in every
case, would protect the third party against spurious impleader and
yet, like the New York system, avoid the double hearings objec-
tion.31 The benefit here offered the third party is illusory, however,
since objecting to the defendant's motion for court permission to
bring in a third party will be just as burdensome as seeking, on the
same grounds, a dismissal or severance of the third-party action.
The only practical difference between this modification of the cr-
missive system and impleader as of right would be the time at which
the third party becomes a formal party to the action. Under the
modified permissive system, the third party would be notified of
28. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
29. See Smith v. Brown, 72 N.Y.S.2d 867 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
80. "Appearance" has been defined as "voluntary submission to the court's jurisdic-
tion." Pacilio v. Scarpati, 800 N.Y.S. 478, 478, 165 Misc. 586, 588 (N.Y. City Ct. 1987).
81. To date no jurisdiction has adopted this system of impleader.
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the impleader long enough in advance of his becoming a party to
the action so that he could easily remove his liquid assets from the
jurisdiction before they could be attached by the defendant." On
the other hand, the New York system permits the defendant to tie
up the third party's assets before the court has determined whether
or not the third-party claim is warranted. Such action undoubtedly
would present a heavy burden to most individuals and small busi-
nesses impleaded on the basis of unwarranted claims. The interests
of the court and the defendant in having a simplified impleader sys-
tem probably outweigh the third partys interest in preventing at-
tachment of his assets on an unwarranted claim, however, especially
since a permissive system requiring notice to the third party could
pose a substantial barrier to the defendant's effectively prosecuting
a good third-party claim.
HYBRm ImLEADER
A third type of impleader is illustrated by the Illinois procedure:
Within the time for filing his answer or thereafter by leave of court, a
defendant may by third-party complaint bring in as a defendant a person
not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part
of the plaintiff's claim against him .... 3
This procedure is a hybrid of the permissive and New York im-
pleader systems. Until the time for filing his answer has elapsed, a
defendant may implead a third party as a matter of right, but after
that time has elapsed he must obtain the court's permission to do
SO. 3
4
The Illinois system seeks both to combine the advantages and to
avoid the disadvantages of the permissive and New York proce-
dures. By promptly exercising his right to implead, the defendant
can spare himself and the court the procedural inconveniences in-
herent in the permissive system. The Illinois system encourages the
defendant to implead a third party early in the proceedings and
thereby gives all the parties more time in which to prepare their
32. Normally the third party's assets cannot be attached until he becomes a party
to the action. See 7 C.J.S. Attachment § 181 (1937).
33. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 110, § 25(2) (Smith-Hurd 1956). (Emphasis added.)
34. The following states have adopted the same or substantially similar procedures:
Maryland: M. R. Crv. P. 315(a), (b).
Pennsylvania: PA. R. Cv. P. 2252, 2258. See 3 CooDucH-AaNiA .f, STAND AD Pmnm-
sYLvAmA PBAcncE §§ 2252,2253 (1953). See also, AuxALTr, RuzLE 56.
Louisiana's procedure for impleading third parties is not entirely clear. LA. REv. STAT.
ANaz. §§ 13.3381-86 (Supp. 1957), permit a defendant to implead a third party by
filing a petition, but contain no provisions as to when the petition may be filed, or
whether it may be filed with or without the court's permission. See MeMahon, Courts
and Judicial Procedure, 15 LA. L. REv. 38, 49 (1954). As proposed, the Louisiana pro-
cedure would have been similar to Admiralty Rule 56. See Expos6 Des Motifs No. 7,
Code of Practice Revision, Louisiana State Law Institute, "Book IL Rules of Pleading
and Practice in Ordinary Process, Title I Pleading" 82 (1953).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
claims and defenses, and perhaps arrive at an out-of-court settle-
ment. Also where the defendant seeks to implead a third party at
a later stage in the lawsuit, the plaintiff's interests are protected by
the court-permission requirement."
However, this system is less successful in avoiding the disadvan-
tages of the permissive and New York procedures than it is in re-
taining their respective advantages. When the defendant impleads
a third party after the time for impleader as of right has elapsed,
the procedural inconveniences of the permissive system still exist.
Furthermore, to take advantage of the relatively short time in which
impleader as of right is available, defendants are encouraged to as-
sert third-party claims which they would otherwise discard after a
more careful investigation of the facts.
The Pennsylvania procedure, also of the hybrid type, allows im-
pleader as of right any time within sixty days "after the service
upon the original defendant of the initial pleading of the plaintiff
of any amendment thereof .. ." In all likelihood, the sixty day
period would provide ample time for the attorneys to fully consider
all the relevant questions of fact and law. It follows that by allow-
ing the defendant sixty days to decide whether or not to implead a
third party, rather than the much shorter "time for filing his an-
swer," the Pennsylvania rule avoids encouraging third-party actions
which on careful analysis are unwarranted. This procedure should
also allow more defendants to take advantage of the simplified
method of impleader without any prejudice to the plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
Upon close analysis of the three methods of impleader, the fol-
lowing conclusions seem warranted. First, the permissive method is
procedurally inefficient; the small amount of protection afforded the
plaintiff's interests by the court-permission requirement does not
justify the resulting procedural inconvenience to the defendant and
the court. Second, the New York system is undoubtedly the most
35. MD. R. Civ. 315(b) provides that after the time allowed for impleader as of right
has elapsed, the defendant may implead a third party "only upon consent of the plaintiff
or upon a showing that the delay was excusable or does not prejudice other parties to
the action." Thus, where it is apparent that the plaintiff will not be prejudiced, the de-
fendant probably will be able to obtain the plaintiffs consent and implead the third
party without having to obtain the court's permission. Where the plaintiff consents, the
defendant and the court will be saved the time and expense of a hearing on the de-
fendant's request for permission.
3 GOODHICH-AmrtAM, STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE § 2253-2 at 40 (1953),
states: ". . . there must be some limitation in order to prevent unreasonable delay or
the burdening of the action by the joinder of an unreasonable number of additional de-
fendants."
36. PA. R. Civ. P. 2253; see 3 GOODRICH-AmRAm, STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA Pt1AcTICE
§ 2253 (1953). In Maryland the defendant has thirty days after the action is at issue.
MD. R. Civ. P. 315(b).
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procedurally efficient of the three methods, but it fails to give com-
plete protection to the plaintiff's interests. Third, the hybrid system,
although less procedurally efficient than the New York system, pro-
vides the plaintiff's interests more adequate protection.
With the standards of procedural efficiency and fairness to the
parties as guides, it must be concluded the New York and hybrid
systems of impleader are almost satisfactory alternatives. One's pref-
erence depends upon which standard is emphasized. However, as a
matter of fairness to the parties, the system which will encourage
the defendant to implead the third party during the early stages
of the lawsuit should be preferred. Since the New York procedure
imposes no time limit on the exercise of defendant's right to im-
plead, the defendant has no particular incentive to exercise his right
promptly. Under the hybrid system, however, the defendant can
escape the inconvenience of obtaining the court's permission only
by promptly exercising his right to implead. This consideration leads
to the conclusion that the hybrid system best satisfies both the stand-
ards of procedural efficiency and fairness to the parties involved in
the action.
1958]
